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Abstract: 
 
In this article I engage with the theoretical opening provided by Barry Buzan’s From International to 
World Society? I present an argument for five functional categories, which should be able to 
encompass all of the institutions identified by English School scholars throughout history. Their 
introduction should point the way towards a more sound analytical framework for the study of what 
Buzan believes should be the new subject of the discipline of International Relations (IR). This 
subject is defined as second-order societies, meaning societies ‘where the members are not 
individual human beings, but durable collectivities of humans possessed of identities and actor 
qualities that are more than the sum of their parts’, and where the content of these societies, and 
the key object of analysis, is primary institutions. The purpose of the five functional categories is to 
break down this ‘social whole’ and provide a set of lenses through which to potentially analyse 
international societies throughout history. 
 
Keywords: constructivism; English school; functional differentiation; international society; primary 
institutions; sociology.  
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 When The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics was first published in 1977, 
Michael Mandelbaum commented: ‘Bull has written that rarest of books: It is not the last, but the 
first word on its subject’.1 Something similar could be said of Barry Buzan’s From International to 
World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation.2 Although it is not 
the first word on its subject, it is the first word of a new chapter in the international society debate. 
No one is more cognisant of this than Buzan, who in his conclusion remarks that the book is meant 
as ‘an opening rather than a closing’.3  
In this article I will attempt to respond to this opening by critically engaging with the 
conceptual debate instigated by Buzan, specifically the central concept of primary institutions. In 
doing this I present an argument for five functional categories, which should be able to encompass 
all of the institutions identified by English School scholars throughout history. Although I am keen 
to stress that my conceptualisation of the five functional categories is only a first attempt, their 
introduction should point the way towards a more sound analytical framework for the study of what 
Buzan believes should be the new subject of the discipline of International Relations (IR). This 
subject is defined as second-order societies, meaning societies ‘where the members are not 
individual human beings, but durable collectivities of humans possessed of identities and actor 
qualities that are more than the sum of their parts’4, and where the content of these societies, and 
the key objects of analysis, are the primary institutions that define international social life. The 
purpose of the five functional categories is to break down this ‘social whole’ and provide a set of 
lenses through which to potentially analyse international societies throughout history. 
Some might object that the proper subject of IR should be our present international society 
and the problems it faces. This is, for example, the view found in Robert Keohane’s agenda-setting 
address to the International Studies Association, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, 
where he argued that we should study international institutions for the purpose of furthering the 
cause of international cooperation in the contemporary world.5 This is indeed in line with the 
traditional way of approaching our discipline – namely as generating prescriptions for foreign 
policy. However, if one is interested in a sociological, and dare I say scientific rather than 
normative, approach to the discipline, there is no era of history that is a priori more interesting than 
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another. Furthermore, it becomes important to clarify how IR can contribute to sociology rather 
than just be subsumed within it. This is where the idea that we are looking at second-order 
societies, whereas sociologists are mainly looking at societies made up of individuals, becomes a 
way of defining a new rationale/added-value for the discipline. 
A second potential objection, this time emanating not from IR scholars but from 
sociologists, is that functionalism, or structural functionalism associated with such writers as Talcott 
Parsons, Robert Merton and Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy (neofunctionalism), occupies an 
increasingly marginalised position within sociology. If this is so, why try to export the idea/theory to 
the study of second-order societies? The short answer is that what is exported is a ‘stripped’ form 
of functionalism with the explanatory elements taken out. All functional theories within sociology 
have posited that social institutions contribute to, and are indeed functionally determined by, 
certain broad societal goals having to do with order and stability. And to a large extent the debates 
within the structural functionalist camp are about to which degree these goals can be said to 
single-handedly determine the content of individual institutions. Hedley Bull, in his classic study of 
order in international society, was careful to point out that his was not a structural functionalist 
argument.6 However, this does not seem very convincing when he simultaneously argued that the 
institutions war, diplomacy, the balance of power, the great powers and international law sustained 
three elementary goals of social life. In other words, they provided for order. However, the 
functionalism I will introduce below is of a different kind, and thus sidesteps the major criticism 
levelled at this theory, namely that its basic mode of explanation is tautological.7 There is no 
explanatory content in the functional theory presented here. It is basically a typology, following 
George and Bennett8, based on the principle of differentiating between functionally defined 
activities at the international level. It can thus be said to be a pre-theory in the sense that it only 
aspires to a categorical scheme.9 All this said, I cannot stress enough that this article merely 
amounts to a preliminary discussion of some of the possible ways of functionally differentiating 
between institutions. What will appear below is far from a fully-fledged sociological theory of 
international relations. It is, however, an important addition to the debate opened by Buzan.  
 The article is organised into four sections. In the first section I will look at the basic problem 
of differentiating between primary institutions, as it has been explored by Buzan in From 
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International to World Society? In the second section I will discuss a potential solution to this 
problem, namely that of functional differentiation and outline my critique of Buzan’s attempt to 
follow this approach. Finally, sections three and four will be dedicated to elaborating the five 
functional categories, or what could potentially amount to a ‘new institutionalism’.10 
        
Primary institutions take one: the basic problem of differentiation 
Arguably the greatest novelty in Buzan’s structural framework is that of primary institutions. He 
defined them as ‘durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held 
commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and 
principles’.11 They are to be contrasted with the ‘secondary institutions’ talked about in liberal 
institutionalist theory: consciously designed regimes or organisations for dealing with various 
problems in international affairs.12 The novelty has not so much to do with the sociological idea of 
institutions as patterned practices – this has in many ways been the core idea of the English 
School ‘project’ since its inception – but rather the conceptual clarity he sought to bring to the 
debate about institutions within the School. Here I will not go into the problem of how to empirically 
observe primary institutions, but merely offer some potential solutions to the problem of 
differentiating between them. I should also emphasise at the outset that I agree with Buzan’s basic 
definition of primary institutions above. This is a quite expansive definition, and as the reader shall 
see below, many things can be captured by it, from mercantilism to human rights. Some have a 
long life span, historically speaking, some are more ephemeral.      
In an illustrative analysis of six key authors, Buzan shows how each of them comes up with 
specific, though often over-lapping, catalogues of the institutions of international society. Examples 
range from ‘religious rites and festivals’, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘trade’ to ‘war’, ‘the balance of power’, 
‘international law’ and ‘colonialism’. However, none of these authors have managed to elaborate 
any transparent criteria for inclusion or exclusion within the category or differentiation within the 
category itself. James Mayall is approaching the inclusion/exclusion problem when he 
distinguishes between institutions (e.g. diplomacy, the balance of power and international law) and 
mere principles (e.g. sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention) and Holsti addresses the 
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second issue with his distinction between foundational and procedural institutions.13 Still, they are 
only scratching the surface of the problem. 
Wight Bull Mayall Holsti James Jackson
Religious sites and festivals
Dynatic principles
Trade Trade (P)
Diplomacy Diplomacy Diplomacy (I) Diplomacy (P) Diplomacy Diplomacy
Alliances
Guarantees
War War War (P) War
Neutrality
Arbitration
Balance of Power Balance of Power Balance of Power (I)
Great power management 
International Law International Law International Law (I) International Law (F) International Law International Law
The State The State (F)
Sovereignty Sovereignty (P) Sovereignty (F) Sovereignty Soverereignty
Territorial Integrity (P) Territoriality (F) Political boundaries
Nonintervention (P)
Self-Determination (P)
Non-Discrimination (P)
Human Rights (P)
Colonialism (F) Colonialism
Notes: for Mayall (I) = institution 
and (P) = principle, for Holsti (F) = 
foundational institution and (P) = 
procedural institution, w ords 
underlined are w here the author 
identif ies an institution as 
'principal', or 'master' or 'bedrock'.  
Table 1 - Candidates for primary institutions of international society by author (adapted 
from Buzan 2004)  
 
Buzan’s provisional solution is to make his own distinction between master and derivative 
institutions. He arrives at this through a critique of especially Holsti’s14 distinction between 
foundational and procedural institutions, mentioned above, and Ruggie’s15 somewhat similar 
distinction between constitutive and regulative rules and Reus-Smit’s16 between constitutional 
structures and fundamental institutions. As he states, the ‘distinctions are based on the idea that 
some (procedural/foundational) institutions are about repetitive practices and interactions, while 
others (foundational/constitutional structures) are about how the actors and the basic rules of the 
game among them are constituted’.17 His problem is that  
 
Both Holsti’s and Reus-Smit’s procedural rules and Ruggie’s regulative ones are trying to define a 
level that is relatively superficial in the sense that it downplays or eliminates the constitutive 
element…the idea here is to capture, as it were, the regular practices that sentient players engage 
in once the actors are established.18  
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 However, as he sees it, this distinction is hard to sustain since there are many examples of 
‘procedural’ institutions changing the nature of the ‘game’, i.e. the constitution and basic behaviour 
of states. Here he holds out the examples of ‘trade’ and ‘war’, identified as procedural institutions 
by Holsti.19 He concludes that the constitutive/regulative distinction cannot be used as a basis for 
differentiation between primary institutions and instead pursues his own master/derivate 
distinction.20   
Yet, this distinction is equally problematic. Basically he proposes that the simplest solution 
is to approach differentiation as nesting. As he contends, ‘it is clear that some of the candidates 
[primary institutions] do stand alone, whereas others are derivative’.21   
                              Primary Institutions 
Master Derivative
Sovereignty Non-intervention
International law
Territoriality Boundaries
Diplomacy Messengers/diplomats
Conferences/Congresses
Multilateralism
Diplomatic language
Arbitration
Balance of power Anti-hegemonism
Alliances
Guarantees
Neutrality
War
Great power management
Equality of people Human Rights
Humanitarian intervention
Inequality of people Colonialism
Dynasticism
Trade Market
Protectionism
Hegemonic stability
Nationalism Self-determination
Popular sovereignty
Democracy  
Table 2 – The nested hierarchy of international institutions (adapted from Buzan 
2004) 
 
Although I agree that some institutions are clearly derived from others, it is not terribly clear on the 
basis of which principles he makes this distinction. He does engage in some discussion about why 
to include institutions such as sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy and the balance of power on the 
list of primary master institutions, but no clear benchmarks are established. Maybe he discarded 
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the constitutive/regulative distinction a bit too quickly? The claim that Holsti, Reus-Smit and Ruggie 
neglected the impact of regulative institutions on constitutive institutions does not necessarily mean 
that we should abandon the distinction as such. It could just as well serve as an argument for 
conceptualising the relationship in more detail.    
In fact, this is to some extent what Buzan is attempting in the final section of his chapter on 
primary institutions. Here he picks up on the idea of functional differentiation. Partly based on the 
work of Bull, Reus-Smit, Alan James and Jack Donnelly, he proposes five categories of functions: 
1) membership; 2) authoritative communication; 3) limits to the use of force, 4) allocation of 
property rights; and 5) sanctity of agreements. Here the function of membership is tied to the idea 
of the constitutive rules which define the nature of the game, e.g. ‘self-determination’, ‘colonialism’, 
‘nationalism’, ‘popular sovereignty’, ‘democracy’ etc., whereas the remaining four are tied to 
functional forms of interaction between the members of international society.22 However, Buzan 
does not develop this idea of differentiation for the very simple reason that he does not have the 
space to do so! He concludes by saying that ‘this discussion does no more than open the door on 
the question of how to understand the primary institutions of international society in functional 
terms’.23 
 
Primary institutions take two: functional differentiation 
I am very sympathetic to the idea of pursuing a functional take on primary institutions. It responds 
directly to Nicholas Onuf’s concern that a genuinely historical English School approach will only 
succeed in producing long, open-ended lists of institutions, without discerning any patterns or 
developmental tendencies.24 The functional categories I intend to discuss here should help 
establish the foundation for a typology, and in the longer term social science theory25, thus 
invalidating this concern. Furthermore, there is a long tradition in both political science and in 
sociology of thinking about social phenomena in functional terms. Michael Mann’s monumental 
work of macrosociology The Sources of Social Power stands out in this respect, with his distinction 
between four functional power networks in society: ideological, economic, military and political.26 It 
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therefore seems a reasonable endeavour to at least consider what the idea of functional 
differentiation can mean for the English School and IR.    
In what follows I will discuss Buzan’s and Donnelly’s27 attempts to establish a set of 
functional categories for primary institutions. I do not pretend to be able to move conclusively 
beyond these, but I do want to emphasise some problematic elements in their respective 
approaches and suggest some possible alternatives. I will also maintain the distinction between 
regulative and constitutive institutions precisely because some institutions seem to be 
predominantly about constitutive questions of membership and legitimate conduct, whereas others 
seem to be tied more directly to different areas of interaction. Ian Clark has argued that questions 
of legitimacy and membership are somehow more basic and different from primary institutions, and 
I will discuss this in the section on the constitutive functional category.28 However, I would like to 
stress that I do not have a lot invested in this debate about the distinction between constitutive and 
regulative. To me, it just seems to be a useful way of separating questions of membership and 
legitimate conduct from the rest of what is going on between polities. The theoretical relationship 
between the two is still an open question from my perspective. Lastly, my critical comments to 
Buzan and Donnelly are informed by the ambition to create more genuine historical-sociological 
theory, and will thus mostly revolve around a number of problems related to Western-centrism. The 
key idea, following Fred Halliday, is to caution against essentialising concepts that inherently 
belong to the modern era of history: 
 
The second constitutive error within the English school approach to international relations, and to 
history as a whole, lies in its acceptance of a continuous historical narrative of international and 
interstate relations going back centuries and millennia…By contrast, the insistence of writers such 
as Karl Polanyi in economic history, of Ernest Gellner in sociology and of Eric Hobsbawm in history 
on the great divide that separates the pre-modern and modern worlds entails that we cannot write 
of political and social categories, be they market, state, family, economy or war, in abstract, or treat 
superficially similar instances of any of these from different centuries and epochs as meaningfully 
similar.29  
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To give the reader a better grasp of the reconfiguration attempted here, table 3 sets out the 
different lists of categories by author, including Bull’s, which Buzan’s scheme is mainly based on. It 
will be useful to refer back to this over the course of the argument in the following two sections.      
 
Buzan Bull Donnelly Schouenborg
1) Membership 1) Legitimacy and 
membership
2) Authoritative 
communication
1) Communicating and 
interacting
2) Authoritative 
communication
3) Limits to the use of 
force
1) Limits to the use of 
force
2) Regulating the use 
of force
4) Allocation of 
property rights
2) Allocation of 
property rights
3) Regulating 
ownership and 
exchange
3) Trade
5) Sanctity of 
agreements
3) Sanctity of 
agreements
4) Making rules
5) Aggregating 
interests and power
4) International 
organisation
6) Regulating conflicts 5) Regulating conflicts
 
Table 1 - Functional categories for primary institutions by author (the table also illustrates 
where the authors’ categories meaningfully overlap) 
 
 
Primary institutions take three: the constitutive category 
 
So I will begin by discussing Buzan’s first category ‘membership’ which he thinks is important for 
defining international society’s constitutive rules and who the players/actors are.30 As already 
mentioned above, Clark has claimed that legitimacy is the defining feature of international society. 
This claim was proposed as a direct alternative to that of institutions, subscribed to by Buzan and 
others. As he argues:  
 
This [institutions] may be appropriate for describing international society at any point, but is overly 
cumbersome for any essentialist definition: since the institutions of international society are 
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evidently changeable, one wonders why there is a need to identify international society per se with 
any one institution in particular. Instead, we should identify a more fundamental property of which 
these institutions are an expression.31  
 
This property is legitimacy, or more precisely, the belief in being bound by some moral principle.  
 
This is the essentialist - albeit minimalist – notion of international society. Core principles of 
legitimacy articulate a willingness to be bound, both to certain conceptions of rightful membership 
of society, and to certain conceptions of rightful conduct within it. This is what defines international 
society, rather than its expression in any specific institutions or values – all of which are historically 
variable.32  
 
I will argue that Clark falls into the same trap as the one he sets for the scholars he is arguing 
against: His principles of legitimacy – according to his own analysis, as well as other authors who 
have dealt with this issue33 - are just as malleable as the primary institutions he is posing against. 
Furthermore, Clark also holds that primary institutions are expressions of these principles. This is 
the one-way causal relationship between constitutive and regulative institutions which was 
discarded above. As Buzan rightly emphasises, it is possible to identify several instances where 
supposedly regulative institutions, for example ‘war’ and ‘trade’, have had an impact on what 
counts as legitimate in international society.34 Yet, I have no problem with seeing legitimacy as an 
essential, constitutive functional category of international society, along with the other functional 
regulative categories defined below. It is different in that it captures constitutive primary institutions, 
but again, there are no grounds for causally privileging these vis-à-vis the regulative institutions.  
I realise that proposing the simple category of legitimacy and membership is problematic in 
so far as so many different principles can be bundled within it. In this sense it is not so much a 
solution to the problem of differentiation but its reification. I doubt, however, whether it is possible 
to create any meaningful sub-categories. Let me explain by way of drawing on the story of 
legitimacy in Westphalian international society. 
A consensus gradually emerged in Europe after the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster in 
1648 to the effect that the princes of Europe had a right to exclusive jurisdiction within a specified 
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territory. This is what is normally understood as the original principle of sovereignty.35 This should 
not be taken to mean that dynasticism, understood as the hereditary title to exclusive, territorial 
jurisdiction, was the only principle present at the time. As Wight reminds us, dynasts co-existed 
with the ‘great republics’ (e.g. Venice, the Swiss Confederation and the United Provinces), the 
Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.36 However, the dynastic claim to sovereignty was the 
dominant principle. Following the American and French revolutions, a new principle became 
established, namely that of the popular will. The claim to exclusive, territorial jurisdiction no longer 
resided with the prince but with the people. The principle seems simple, but is in fact immensely 
complex due to a basic logical paradox which was so nicely captured by Ivor Jennings in 1956: ‘On 
the surface it seemed reasonable: let the People decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people’.37  
A host of auxiliary principles appeared as a response to this paradox. A major one was that 
of nationalism, where sovereignty were proclaimed to reside in the popular will of the nation, 
however defined. A second major one was that of communism, with sovereignty thought to be 
residing initially in the popular will of a transnational proletariat and eventually, through the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, a harmonious community of mankind.38 More concrete, and one 
could add sophisticated, principles were soon developed to judge the sovereign potential of a 
people, and by extension, a state. These included the ‘standard of civilization’, explored by Gong39, 
the ‘capacity to govern’ in the League of Nations’ criteria for membership, the eventual UN criterion 
of being a ‘peace-loving’ nation, and all the way up to the Copenhagen criteria of democracy and a 
free-market economy for joining the EU40 and the universal respect for human rights, which can 
also to some extent be viewed as a principle derived from the inherent sovereignty of the people. 
In many ways, these can be seen as attempts at drawing a circle around what in these ideologies 
should constitute ‘the People’. 
The point, however, is that the fundamental paradox of rule based on popular will has never 
been resolved. On the contrary, tension between various principles remains. Furthermore, this is 
probably to be expected of any international society. And even though the story above conveys the 
message that some principles are derived from or developed in response to the shortcomings of 
others, it is not immediately clear to me if there are any potential analytical rewards in 
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differentiating between them and especially where to set the benchmarks. Table 4 provides 
suggestive list of principles of legitimacy in Westphalian international society based on the 
discussion (note that it is not meant to be exhaustive!).            
 
The Constitutive Functional Category Primary Institutions 
Legitmacy and membership Sovereignty
Dynasticism
Popular will
Nationalism
Communism
Liberal democracy
 'The standard of civilization'
Capacity to govern 
 'Peace-loving nation'
Human rights 
 
Table 2 – The constitutive functional category with suggestive primary institutions 
 
 
However, moving beyond the modern or Westphalian era, I believe we also need to think 
more carefully about the nature of the presumed units of international society: the kinds of 
collective entities that can qualify as members. Going back to Halliday’s quote above, he argues 
that the English School has a problematic conception of the importance of the state.  While 
Halliday’s is a specific critique of the English School, a number of scholars over past 20 years have 
forcefully stressed the problem of IR’s reliance on an essential notion of the state.41 To be more 
precise, Buzan defines the state as ‘any form of post-kinship, territorially based, politically 
centralized, self-governing entity capable of generating an inside-outside structure’.42 The problem, 
as Osiander points out, is that this definition only seems to be a somewhat good fit with political 
entities present in the modern era, say, the post-18th century world.43 Before that, many political 
communities were decentralised, not territorially based and non-exclusive. Perhaps the biggest 
problem here is the exclusivity that seems to come through in the idea of ‘self-governing entity 
capable of generating an inside-outside structure’. Again according to Osiander, it is a very modern 
idea that people should be unambiguously and exclusively associated with one authority and 
constitute one community.44   
Following on from this, I therefore agree with Osiander’s more basic definition which holds 
that political communities ‘consist of individuals considering themselves and each other to share 
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important interests across a range of issues’45; and when this develops into the legitimisation of 
one or more authorities to act on behalf of that community, I will refer to these as polities.46 In this 
scheme it will possible to operate with the concept of a state, but only as a specific type of polity 
that belongs to the modern era. It is true that this move may lead to a problem of analytical 
holism47, as so many things can be captured by these concepts - anything from a family unit to an 
empire count as a polity. Yet, I do think it is essential for avoiding the tendency of projecting 
concepts derived from our understanding of modern international relations onto the past and thus 
for developing truly historical-sociological theory.48 Consequently, we may come across historical 
international societies where there are many competing principles of legitimacy due to the 
presence of many different types of polities. It is certainly also possible to imagine that some 
polities will not recognise each other as members belonging to the same society of collectivities. 
The latter is probably what classical English School scholars would term a system of states, 
highlighting the absence of social consensus between the relevant units. However, and here I 
agree with Buzan, conflict and discord are also social phenomena.49 The basic point is that what 
counts as legitimate in any given period of history, and whether there exists a consensus about 
this, is an empirical question that the constitutive functional category, as an analytical lens, will 
allow us to get a handle on.   
 
Primary institutions take four: regulative categories 
 
Buzan’s five functional categories are: 1) membership; 2) authoritative communication; 3) limits to 
the use of force; 4) allocation of property rights; and 5) sanctity of agreements. The membership 
category was discussed above, and here I will consequently focus on what I term regulative 
functional categories: 2 to 5. 
The four regulative functional categories are all - with the exception of authoritative 
communication, which I will reserve for the discussion of Donnelly’s scheme below - drawn from 
Bull’s definition of the elementary goals of any society.50 They thus give the impression of having 
universal validity across time. However, I believe it is possible to question whether that is in fact the 
case. 
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To start with limits to the use of force, many international societies throughout history may 
have had this as one of their goals or maybe even ordering principles. However, it can easily be 
argued that this goal obtained an extreme sense of urgency in Westphalian international society 
after the almost unfathomable destruction of the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic wars, 
followed by the exponential increases of WWI and WWII. The threat of a nuclear holocaust 
descending on mankind after the invention of the atom bomb probably only served to strengthen 
this trend. This is what Deudney seems to be getting at with his concept of increasing ‘violence 
interdependence’51, and it is reinforced by Osiander’s detailed study of political ideas in ancient 
Greece: 
 
The relative difficulty of inflicting material destruction (compared to what we are accustomed to) 
helps explain what many present-day authors have found odd, to wit, that period observers display 
little fear or rejection of warfare as such. They did not see it as a social problem – even though they 
regarded domestic, civil, war as a very serious political problem [his emphasis].52 
 
Therefore, it is arguably not far off the mark to say that there is a bias in the Westphalian tradition 
towards seeing limits to the use of force as a fundamental function of international society. For long 
stretches of history, warfare has been considered entirely legitimate and not as something that 
should necessarily be limited; it was not considered a social problem, to paraphrase Osiander.    
The issue, however, is that if one adopts this functional category, as Buzan does, then one 
is likely to end up identifying great power management, war, alliances, neutrality and the balance 
of power as institutions that perform this function.53 This may be true of the Westphalian 
international society, but considering these institutions from the vantage point of pre-modern 
history, they have often served the cause of violence – that is to the extent that it is actually 
possible to operate with such generic categories as war, alliances and great power compacts 
during these eras (again see the quote by Halliday above).  
Proceeding to the allocation of property rights, it can equally be argued that the idea of 
property is one of the foundational principles of the Western liberal tradition, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon sphere.54 This is not to say that other historical international societies did not operate 
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with some idea of property or possessions, most certainly they did. The point, however, is that this 
was seldom formulated as an inalienable individual right, as in the Western tradition. An 
individual’s right to possess something was not separated from broader societal and political 
concerns. Instead of privileging the idea of property, a more suitable functional category would 
probably be production or exchange, or maybe just the simple term ‘trade’. More on this below. 
However, let me again stress that this not an attack on the general idea of property in history, it is 
only a call to caution against conflating a modern understanding of the concept with those found in 
the past. I would imagine that Buzan would broadly agree with this point. Yet, he does not clearly 
specify what he means by property.   
Finally, the sanctity of agreements, which Buzan sees as being mainly about international 
law and its antecedents55, also has a distinctly Westphalian ring to it. Some historical international 
societies have undoubtedly engaged in explicit rule-making. Yet, the role of international law in 
Westphalian international society is pervasive. As Keene has points out, the very idea of 
international society was invented by legal scholars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to 
give legitimacy to the force of the law of nations (jus gentium) with reference to a society of nations 
(societas gentium).56 Also, one only has to consider that up until WWII the object of analysis in the 
study of international relations in especially the US academy was international law.57 That said, it is 
not clear to me why explicit rule-making should be considered a functional category at all. If it was 
not for the strong Westphalian focus on international law, a more logical move would be to group it 
in a category with practices and norms, i.e. as a mechanism for regulating behaviour; a property of 
primary institutions, not a functional category. Here practices are thought of as behaviour justified 
with simple reference to custom, and norms with reference to implicit or explicit moral imperatives. 
One could also conceptualise international law as a pattern of legitimacy and hence a primary 
institution in the constitutive functional category. This is in line with Onuma’s perspective in the 
article ‘When was the Law of International Society Born?’, in which he argues that it is a unique 
normative system that originated at a specific point in Western history.58    
To sum up, while I would not claim that Bull’s and Buzan’s three categories – limits to the 
use of force, allocation of property rights and sanctity of agreements - are wrong as such, I will hold 
that they need to be reconfigured somewhat if they are to be applicable to all of recorded history 
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(of course realising that the two authors may only have been interested in conceptualising modern 
international society!). To proceed with this reconfiguration, I will now discuss how Buzan’s second 
functional regulative category - authoritative communication - lines up with Donnelly’s framework. 
Buzan credits Donnelly with being the first to have started down the functional path in 
thinking about the institutions of international society.59 His six functional categories are: 1) 
communicating and interacting (diplomacy); 2) regulating the use of force (just war rules, limits to 
who can legitimately perpetrate violence); 3) regulating ownership and exchange (property rights 
and trade); 4) making rules (international law); 5) aggregating interests and power (alliances, 
feudal obligations, international organisations etc.); and 6) regulating conflicts (war, treaty making, 
arbitration)(Donnelly 2006, 11-2).60  
Donnelly’s ‘making rules’ category seems to be problematic for the same reasons that were 
covered above: the prominence of international law is something that is intimately tied to 
Westphalian international society. Instead one could view explicit rule-making as a potential 
property of individual primary institutions (as a mechanism for regulating behaviour) or as a specific 
legitimacy principle, defining the rightful members of international society.  
‘Regulating conflicts’ is a more promising functional category. Conflicts always arise 
between members of a social system, and it is probably not wrong to see institutions such as war, 
the balance of power, great power management, alliances, adjudication, arbitration etc. as mainly 
belonging to this category. However, I do not see why the ‘regulation of the use of force’ warrants a 
separate category. One thing is to regulate the use of force in combat (jus in bello). In this instance 
it should probably be seen as a property of the institution of war. Another thing is to regulate what 
goals organised violence can legitimately be used to pursue (jus ad bellum). Yet, this question 
seems to be tied more to issues of membership and legitimate conduct. For example, in pre-1815 
Europe it was considered legitimate to engage in wars of conquest, and in the ancient world, Rome 
had no qualms about exterminating barbarians as well as seemingly ‘civilised’ polities such as 
Carthage. However, in the modern era war has been largely de-legitimised and can only be 
rightfully employed against polities that are considered to be less than full members of international 
society, such as revolutionary states, aggressors and so-called rogue states. The issue of use of 
violent force thus appears to be bound up in various ways with the question of membership and 
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legitimate conduct. What should be emphasised, though, is that regulation of conflict should not be 
taken to imply that conflict settlement is normatively desirable or even a priority - only that different 
international societies appear to establish different means of settling disputes. Aggressive warfare 
may be one of them.  
The ‘regulating ownership and exchange’ category seems fine as such. However, I would 
again take care not to conflate modern understandings of property and market economics with 
exchange relationships found in the past. Particularly, I would stress that the emphasis on 
individual property rights is something which is peculiar to Westphalian international society, as 
discussed previously. As for trade or exchange, throughout history this has performed a plethora of 
functions, some having to do with subsistence consumption, some having to do with the 
accumulation of wealth and yet others having to do with various symbolic, political, military and 
broadly social purposes.61 However, in the modern era exchange relationships did seem to take on 
a specific configuration. As Wallerstein remarks with reference to the period 8-10.000 BC to circa 
1.500 AD: 
 
There were in this period multiple instances of coexisting historical systems…None of them was 
“capitalist” in that none of them was based on the structural pressure for the ceaseless 
accumulation of capital.62 
 
This only came about post-1.500 AD. In a similar fashion, Dalton, following Polanyi, argues that the 
fact 
 
That every society must have substantive economic organization to provide material means of 
existence does not mean that each must have the special set of market exchange institutions for 
the analysis of which formal economic theory was uniquely designed. Indeed, there is increasing 
evidence that the market integrated economy is historically and anthropologically rare.63  
 
This is not to say that Donnelly, nor Buzan, is unaware of these points, but it is to caution others 
against an uncritical application of modern and historically contingent concepts. I will therefore opt 
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for the historically most neutral word I can think of in this connection and call the functional 
category ‘trade’.   
The ‘communicating and interacting’ category is probably one of the most basic functional 
categories which can be identified. Nearly all English School scholars see diplomacy, in one form 
or another, as being a central feature of an international society. This does not mean that 
institutionalised communication is necessarily prior to other forms of functional interaction. Buzan 
and Little have demonstrated how relay trade has historically often been the first form of interaction 
among otherwise isolated polities.64 Moreover, Bull has argued that  the institution of diplomacy 
can perform various functions.65 One example is negotiation, which belongs in the conflict 
regulation category (or the international organisation category, see below), and a second one, the 
function of serving as a symbol of the existence of international society, has to do with membership 
and legitimacy (the constitutive category). Nevertheless, the main function of diplomacy seems to 
be communication. Yet it is probably wise not to conflate diplomacy with this functional category. 
To use the contemporary term ‘diplomacy’ for various forms of institutionalised communication in 
the past can possibly distort our conception of these practices. Consequently, the best approach 
seems to be to hold on to the more neutral term ‘communicating and interacting’ or simply 
‘authoritative communication’.  
Finally, there is the ‘aggregating interests and power’ category. On one hand, I find this 
category a bit problematic, and on the other, I do see a need for it. The first point relates to the fact 
that all of the functional categories above can to some extent be viewed as aggregations of 
interests, i.e. polities cooperate/engage to regulate different aspects of their interactions. One can 
even argue that war is an example of this in that it is an institutionalised expression of certain 
standards for the use of organised violence explicitly or tacitly agreed upon by the polities making 
up an international society. That said, and realising that the basis for talking about an international 
society in the first place is to imagine a set of differentiated polities, there seems to be a need to 
conceptually recognise the various forms political cooperation between them can take. Here I am 
talking about international organisation. Not international organisation in the sense of secondary 
institutions, as defined in a previous section (physical international organisations or regimes), but 
international organisational forms, as for example, Wight’s religious sites and festivals and 
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conferences and congresses66, and in more recent times, multilateralism. Alliances, on the other 
hand, seem to fit more comfortably within the conflict regulation category, close as it (the 
institution) is to war and the balance of power.  
The reconfigured set of regulative categories and corresponding primary institutions are 
displayed in table 5 (please note that the list of primary institutions is merely suggestive!). 
 
Regulative Functional Categories Primary Institutions 
Regulating conflicts War
Great power management
Alliances
Trade Relay trade
Tribute systems 
Free trade
Authoritative communication Messengers
Diplomats
Embassies
International organisation Religious sites and festivals
Conferences and congresses
Multilateralism
 
Table 3 – The regulative functional categories and suggestive primary institutions 
 
I will again not claim that this discussion of possible ways of functionally differentiating between 
primary institutions has been exhaustive. Far from it. However, I hope I have imparted a little bit of 
extra clarity to the debate, and raised some issues that should be considered if one wants use this 
scheme for producing comparative historical-sociological studies of international societies of the 
past, as well as appropriately relate these to the modern era.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have attempted to critically engage with the conceptual debate instigated by Buzan, 
and I would like to follow his lead in saying that this is indeed an opening rather than a closing. The 
definitions and categories arrived at here should by no means be seen as final.  
My point of departure was to take sociological theorising about second-order/international 
societies one step further by elaborating five functional categories to divide up this social whole. It 
should again be stressed that these are abstract analytical lenses. They do not have ontological 
status, only second-order societies and primary institutions have. To use an analogy from biology, 
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primary institutions are the actual ‘creatures’ out there in the real world, while the functional 
categories are the system for dividing them into various ‘species’. I believe that the categories 
proposed here – 1) legitimacy and membership; 2) regulating conflicts; 3) trade; 4) authoritative 
communication; and 5) international organisation - represent a substantial improvement compared 
to the functional categories elaborated by Buzan and Donnelly since their frameworks were 
hampered by elements of Western-centrism and the restricting idea of a society of states.  
We now have a preliminary conceptual ‘net’ to go fishing with in the past. This could throw 
up fascinating questions concerning institutional differentiation in various historical international 
societies and between them. However, the point should be reinforced that this is indeed a 
preliminary conceptual net. For the five functional categories to obtain any definitive theoretical 
standing, they would have to be subject to systematic empirical tests. One such ‘stress’ test could 
be to apply them to systems of polities that are radically different from the modern Western 
international society, for example, ancient tribal systems in Africa, nomadic ‘empires’ in Central 
Asia and the pre-modern Polynesian civilisation.      
▪                    ▪                    ▪ 
As Tim Dunne discussed in a recent essay on the new agenda of the English School, there 
currently seems to be a spilt between ‘hedgehogs’ and ‘foxes’, to use Isaiah Berlin’s terminology. 
Between those scholars who pursue holistic accounts of the social world and those who are more 
inclined to analytic disaggregation. To be more precise, a bifurcation between a neo-English 
School theory that is multilayered and explicit about its methodology and ontology, and a 
neoclassical approach concerned with the history of the ideas which constituted European 
international society and with the normative standing of these ideas.67 Dunne’s point is that there is 
much to be gained from a dialogue between the analytic and normative wings of the English 
School, and I do not necessarily dispute this claim. However, here I would like to reinforce a 
second dialogue, which could be considered even more worthwhile: that between the neo-English 
School (the sociological perspective explored in this article) and constructivism. There have 
already been plenty of writings on the similarities between these two scholarly communities and 
what they can learn from each other.68 Yet, to me it seems that it is only with the arrival of the 
sociological perspective that this dialogue can really take off. There is now a shared epistemology, 
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based on a commitment to being explicit about methodology and ontology. This could clear the 
way for a more sophisticated account of international relations.  
Constructivists have by and large shunned grand theory, with the notable exceptions of 
Alexander Wendt and Reus-Smit.69 They have been concerned with the basic building-blocs of the 
social world in the form of norms, identities and institutions, and have explored the constitution, 
evolution and transformation of these through a great number of very rewarding case studies. To 
simplify, you could term this the bottom-up approach. The English School sociological perspective, 
on the other hand, takes the social whole (international society) as its point of departure. It then 
proceeds to break it down into its constituent parts, but only to put it back together again. What 
could be termed a top-down approach. This is where I think an interesting point of contact exists: 
between the macro-theoretical ambitions of the English School sociological perspective and the 
analytical sophistication of constructivism. Primary institutions and the functional framework 
proposed here could very well serve as the point of departure for such an engagement and 
perhaps pave the way for a new institutionalism in IR. 
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